

Shelter from the Storm
or
Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa

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Fear has never been absent from the human experience, and town building has always contended with the need for protection from danger. Protection from invaders was in fact a principal incentive for building cities, many of whose borders were defined by vast walls, from antiquity through the Renaissance. The city was a relatively safe space. Since then, however, the city has become associated more with danger than with safety. This is because the cannon and then atomic arms rendered city walls feeble protection and because dangers such as civil unrest, crime, and contaminated air and water are usually intensified by the density of cities. Other dangers, such as natural disasters, illness, domestic violence, and poverty, strike everywhere equally, without sparing areas of concentration. We persevere in seeking shelter from these dangers lurking in our midst through a range of architectural and planning solutions, which are described in this collection of essays. To contextualize these essays, I provide here some broad historical strokes that convey the evolving nature of fear in the Western world along with corresponding changes in urban design.

Modern Fear and Modern Urbanism, 1789–1900

A logical starting point for this history of fear is the French Revolution (1789), which marked the emergence of not only new social and power structures, but also new ways of perceiving the world, and, along with these, new sources of fear. Along with the ascendance of a bourgeoisie, time¹ and space were reconceived as being more dynamic and malleable. The new conception of time was expressed in the substitution of a revolutionary calendar for the Christian one in 1793 (though it was abandoned in 1805). The new conception of space was expressed in the adoption of the metric system, new political administrative units (departments replacing provinces), and new street and place names.

While these changes permitted a certain freedom and control over one's life that did not previously exist, they also created a new kind of insecurity because

they introduced the notion of change itself—or our contemporary notion of history—as inevitable. As Alberto Movaria explains,

In history, as is well known, nothing endures or remains fixed or stable; everything is in continuous movement, in a continuous state of development. Everything is subject to aging, to obsolescence, to de-fashionization. Everything transforms itself from the tragic into the comic, from the real into the unreal, from the true into the false, from the adequate into the inadequate, from the current into the obsolete. . . . If nothing stands still, then everything—opinions, styles, information, fortunes, success, groups, society—falls victim to continuous change. Snobbery comes to stand as the fickle and arbitrary surrogate of good taste, which is based no longer on the canon of the beautiful but on that of fashion, of whatever is in vogue.²

Reactions among the bourgeoisie to these rapid changes, and to the notion of the inevitability of change itself, included infatuations with primitivism (as discerned through archaeological remains) and exoticism.

The transition from feudalism to capitalism and the attendant rise of a middle class occasioned versions of these changes throughout the Western world. The Swedish sociologists Jonas Frykman and Orvar Lofgren have described this transition in their country, explaining that the ambivalent—if not contested—relationship of the bourgeoisie to the aristocracy, peasantry, and emerging working class impelled the bourgeoisie to establish a clear identity for itself, to secure its ascendant social position by claiming superiority rather than simply difference, and to ultimately become a “colonizing culture.”³ It did this through a strict compartmentalization of the world, often into “hierarchical polarities,”⁴ and an obsession with control, discipline, and rationality.

Members of the bourgeoisie viewed time as “evolutive,”⁵ aiming to scale the career and/or social ladder at a faster pace than others. Time became “geared to the future, obsessed with development, and the goal [was] to gain control over it.”⁶ The middle class began measuring time by using their personal calendars and wristwatches, both mass produced in the bourgeois-owned factories, rather than by tracking the movement of the sun and the seasons or by checking the village clock mounted on the church steeple, whose bells announced the important moments of the day, week, and year. For the middle class, time was no longer in the hands of God. It was in their own hands or, at least, on their wrists.

The middle class interpreted events as cultural or willed, rather than as natural,⁷ such that competence became the core of their “new charter of legitimacy.”⁸ With regard to time, for instance, the “new message [was that time] is in short supply and must be properly managed [and] that people create their own futures.”⁹ Whereas the answers to “Who are you?” and “Where are you from?”

were the major identity markers for the aristocracy and the peasantry, it was the answer to “What do you do?” that assigned identity and status for the middle class. This led to an unprecedented social and geographic mobility as well as a shift in emphasis from the church to the individual or household. The middle class derided “the peasant world [that was] peopled with supernatural beings, dreadful ghosts, and spirits”¹⁰ and based its own knowledge of the world on so-called “scientific” or “rational” evidence. Accompanying this shift from a religious/divine view of the world to a secular/rational one was a value shift from an emphasis on the collective, what many historians describe as “civic society,” to a striving for independence and self-determination, variously referred to as “familism,” “privatism,” or the “disciplinary society.”

At the same time, “greater moral demands came to be made on parents,” so the privacy of the home “was penetrated by admonitions and counseling.”¹¹ The bourgeoisie criticized the peasantry and the working class for being “unable to bring up their children in a spirit of discipline”¹² as well as for lacking control of bodily functions.¹³ And they were horrified by the lower classes’ ignorance of the rules of privacy, which, for the bourgeoisie, included separate rooms replete with closing doors for specific individuals and activities. In contrast to the aristocracy and the peasantry who “had a more pragmatic view of marriage and a freer attitude to sexuality,”¹⁴ the emergent middle class was victim to repressed sexuality that they disguised “in a cloak of gallantry,”¹⁵ rendering sexuality “both a mystery and a problem as never before.”¹⁶ The bourgeois woman’s dress concealed her body from herself as well as from others for “she had consented to regard herself from a man’s viewpoint,” which saw the female body as “shameful.”¹⁷ When it came to sex, “The women had to learn that male sexuality was animal, something natural to which they were forced to be subordinate. The Victorian woman’s given role was to ‘close her eyes and think of the Empire.’”¹⁸ While men were free to roam the public sphere of Oscarian society, women were largely confined to the domestic sphere.

Like the emergent French middle class, the Swedish one checked and balanced its leap into the future with a nostalgia for the past—often mythologized and reified into ancestor cults and family altars—and a fascination with the other, as demonstrated by the popularity and prestige of history and ethnology as scholarly “disciplines.” This attitude toward time and fate distinguished the bourgeoisie from the peasants who did not reify nature and the past and who viewed life in a more cyclical and collective fashion with established and predictable rights of passage that were communally celebrated.

But this proliferation of sanctions and prohibitions exacted costs, as manifest in the many physical and emotional ailments experienced by bourgeoisie of

all ages. As Lofgren maintains, the "need for absolute self-control combined with uncertainty about the reactions of others created a seedbed for many mental disturbances and illnesses, from everyday neurotic meditation about the self to hysteria and other common Oscarian complaints."¹⁹ In response, new kinds of specialists emerged to offer advice for handling these ailments. They produced an outpouring of guidebooks and manuals on etiquette, homemaking and interior decorating, and sexual relations.

As by-products of industrial capitalism, the new bourgeoisie was bounded by the very logic of the industrial mode of production, which propelled capitalists around the globe in search of markets. They set off a chain effect wherever they went, much like that in the children's story about the goose who laid golden eggs. A man stole this coveted goose, but to his great dismay found that he could not release it. Having discovered the thief, a policeman grabbed him but found that he too became stuck. The wife of the policeman tried to extricate him from the thief but also became glued and this process continued until a long human chain had formed, each link bound to those on either side. The treadmill metaphor is also appropriate for conveying the plight of the capitalist who must keep running just to stand still, who must run faster than others to get ahead, and who slows down or stops at the risk of oblivion.

The insecurities incited by the transition from feudalism to capitalism led to new proposals for building. In the same year that the French Revolution began, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham conceived the Panopticon (Greek for everything, place of sight, or all-seeing), a circular building for containing criminals or workers with cells radially disposed around the perimeter and a circular guardhouse in the center for the inspector. Bentham's proposal allowed the inspector to see the criminals or workers but not vice versa through incorporating very narrow black galleries and strategically placed blinds. This building was conceived explicitly to carry out the task of enlightenment. As Bentham explained, "Morals reformed—health preserved—industry invigorated—instruction diffused—public burdens lightened—economy seated, as it were, upon a rock... all by a simple idea in Architecture."²⁰

In this way, Anthony Vidler maintains, Bentham "turned utopia inside out" by translating city form into building form so that "the radial lines, which in the ideal [eighteenth-century] city were streets converging on the center, were now the partition walls of the cells; the center was no longer the common public place but the exclusive domain of the all-powerful inspector."²¹ Vidler contends that with this development, "the great age of confinement had begun," from the hospital to the prison, insane asylum, old-age home, day-care center, and school.

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From that moment on, "a problem had only to be identified as socially irritant and situated within a group or classified according to a class for a building to be built as the institutional solution to that problem."²²

This marked a shift from the Enlightenment language of natural reason to technical reason.²³ While early- to mid-eighteenth-century Enlightenment city plans relied upon classical geometry and proportional harmony to express man's triumph over nature through the faculty of natural reason, late-eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth-century plans drew from technical reason²⁴ to design cities as agents of progress by applying science and technology to bring about social reform, especially by instilling morals and the work ethic. The opening of communication networks and decentralization were recurrent themes. These concerns led to the 1794 establishment of the *École Polytechnique* in Paris during the revolutionary period to train an elite corps of engineers for the French army (and the *École de Chirurgie* shortly thereafter). The predominant metaphors for cities at this time as organic and/or machinelike guided these urban designs, which were conceived in the spirit of performing surgical operations or repairing broken parts.²⁵ Countering the rationalist tendency of post-Enlightenment city planning, these plans also began to incorporate elements of romanticism and the picturesque.

Examples include Claude-Nicolas Ledoux's *Salines-de-Chaux* (1774-1804), Robert Owen's *Parallelogram plan* (1820), Claude-Henri St. Simon's *New Christianity* (1825—St. Simon, who was deeply influenced by Bentham, used to host dinners to which he invited the leading professors of the *École Polytechnique* to discuss social engineering, and hundreds of St. Simonians were at the school),²⁶ Charles Fourier's *Phalanstery concept* (1829), Etienne Cabet's plan for *Icaria* (1840s), James Silk Buckingham's *Plan of Victoria* (1849), and Louis Napoléon's *Cité Napoléon* in Paris (1849), among others. In the United States a number of attempts at realizing these plans were undertaken, such as Cabet's *Icaria* in Texas and Illinois, Owen's *New Harmony* in Illinois, Fourier's *Phalanstery* at Brook Farm, Massachusetts (1841), and dozens more.

On a larger scale, European capitals were redeveloped during the latter half of the nineteenth century in a variety of ways to accommodate modern life. The most famous instance is the redesign of Paris from 1853-72 overseen by Baron Haussmann and the Emperor Napoleon III, who was closely affiliated with St. Simon in his youth. Haussmann described his interventions in the urban fabric of Paris as "constructive destruction."²⁷ He conceived of the city as an organism and himself as a surgeon cutting out the sick parts and opening clogged arteries in the urban circulatory system. He sought to "clear" slums (*îlots insalubres*, unhealthy islands) and open up "breathing space" (*nettoyage par le vide*). These medical metaphors were used in part to suggest a key motive for the redevelopment, that of preventing further cholera epidemics by reducing overcrowding and improving the water system.

A principal theme of this redevelopment of Paris was *régularisation* or standardization. Haussmann sought to standardize housing, the distance between trees, and much more, to give the city a sense of order. The most important feature of this intervention was the cutting of straight wide boulevards through the medieval urban fabric of Paris. Haussmann "envisioned the new roads as arteries in an urban circulatory system,"²⁸ an image that was revolutionary at the time because the problem of vehicular traffic was new. Streets had been for walking to work or shops and for socializing. Now they were primarily for movement. The goal was to link, to put into communication, and to get rid of sinuosity.²⁹ The boulevards were also intended to quicken the pace of commerce and to stimulate local business by uniting previously isolated sectors of the city and thereby defraying building expenses through an increase in tax money.

There was also a social function for these boulevards. The inherent adversarial relationship between the emergent working class and the propertied class led to considerable uprisings as well as vandalism of property. The propertied class commonly referred to the working class as the "dangerous class," the crowd, or the mob (*la foule*). The construction of these straight, wide boulevards would contend with this danger by employing tens of thousands (at times as much as one quarter of the city's labor force) on public works, which in turn enhanced profit making and provided jobs in the private sector; by razing working-class districts and thereby dispersing established communities, diffusing their power to stage uprisings and perhaps their anger; by creating long broad corridors in which troops and artillery could move effectively against barricades and popular insurrections; and by providing short, direct routes from military barracks to the working-class districts. Finally, there was a representational goal. The redevelopment of Paris would assert state power and prestige through monumental architecture and

urban design, with strategically placed monuments at the ends of vistas. The plan would celebrate the values of the new bourgeoisie by prominently housing this class along the boulevards.

Individual building design was similarly reconceived on the basis of social patterns and the new bourgeoisie's ideas about order. This was particularly apparent in the cultural institutions sponsored by the bourgeoisie, as epitomized in the Barcelona Opera (1837-44)³⁰ and the Paris Opera (1861-75). In housing design, Napoleon III called for uniform facades, apartment buildings (as opposed to townhouses), and separate districts for the middle class to protect them from the threat posed by the working class.³¹

Transformations in interior design occurred alongside those in building and city design. As architecture and planning were growing more rational and functional over the course of the nineteenth century, so were the floor plans of bourgeois homes in their clear division between public and private spaces as well as clearly designated purposes for all spaces, including separate rooms for each child (replacing the nursery for all children) and separate spaces for women's and men's activities. In contrast to this rationalizing and compartmentalizing of space, the decor of these interiors grew more romantic. As Lofgren recounts of the new Swedish middle class, rooms that had previously been austere and simple but multipurpose became opulently and theatrically appointed according to the single function they were to serve.³² These decors connoted "romance, sentimentality, and fantasy"³³ and included generously scattered mirrors so people could observe and appropriately modify their appearance and behavior.³⁴ This elaborate decoration could be interpreted as a compensation for the growing rationality of life or as a reflection of inner fantasies and fears generated by such rationalization. Not incidentally, it was also a means of keeping the bourgeois women busy and thereby diverted from participating in public life.

Modern Fear and Modern Urbanism, 1900-1960s

The nature of fear continued to change during the early part of the twentieth century because of the vast changes wrought by industrialization and urbanization. In order to accommodate factory work, the day took on new rhythms, as did the week, month, and year. There were also changes in gender and family relations and in the relationship between public and domestic spheres. The landscape evolved in order to accommodate the railroads, factories, warehouses, skyscrapers, working-class districts, middle-class suburbs, cars, and highways of the modern industrial city. In addition, the movement of populations and capital around the globe accelerated and the global class and power structure enlarged its scope.

The new constellation of fear accompanying modern industrialization derived from this accelerated change as well as from the unreliable and often substandard working conditions of the new wage-earning class, the inherent antagonism between it and the small class of owners, increased geographic mobility due to the unrelenting search by people for better wages and by workplaces for greater profits, and the constant change in consumer tastes upon which mass production relied. In the United States, the vast cultural diversity resulting from European and Asian migration and from the urban migration of African-Americans also contributed greatly to a sense of insecurity for people of all ethnicities given the concentrated panoply of languages and customs. Insecurity was thus an integral component of industrial capitalism, both within the factory and outside of it.

The means for coping with this new constellation of fear also evolved. Appropriated by the socioindustrial machine, time and space were more precisely measured and divided into units that could be allocated for specific purposes. This allowed for accurate predictions of labor output as well as worker and consumer behavior. Within the factory, time was used as a mechanism for control over others. For instance, some companies did not allow workers to wear watches, so they would not know how long they were working.³⁵ Frederick Winslow Taylor's scientific management, introduced in 1911, refined the process of inscribing work patterns into units of time, and Henry Ford's moving assembly line incorporated space into the process in 1913. The architect Albert Kahn assisted Ford in 1910 by providing a functional shell of steel, concrete, and glass for his plant, a formula for industrial plants that he and others reproduced all over the world. Control over time and space thus joined control over labor power as all were harnessed in the interests of mass production.

Outside the factory, the rationalization and commodification of space was facilitated by various impositions of the grid for urban development and speculation from the early New York City Commissioner's Map of 1811 and the division of central and western United States into one-mile squares to the early twentieth-century city-functional plans, numbering in the hundreds. Beginning around 1900 in Germany and in the 1910s in the United States, zoning marked a further rationalization of space by determining the nature of built form (height, windows, solids and voids) as well as which activities (commercial, residential, business, recreational) should take place in which spaces. As all of this was occurring, the nature of public space altered. Rather than combine production, consumption, movement through the city, and social interaction, public spaces grew more singular in their function. The social and productive aspects of the street and marketplace particularly were suppressed in favor of movement and consumption

respectively. And as public space was transforming, so was private space and the relationship between the two.

As change came to be regarded as inevitable, time became a commodity of which there never seemed to be enough, inciting expressions such as "to spend time," "time is money," "how time flies," "*pas de temps de vivre*," and "*metro, bulot, dodo*." The new conception of time led to a valorization of "leisure" time and an anticipation of a future moment when time would be less tyrannical—retirement—along with a continued fascination for the past (primitivism) and the other (exoticism). The attempt to harness time led to efforts to go beyond the precise measurement and allocation of time in the present to predict the future. This was manifest in efforts to "forecast" weather, in demographic and environmental trends, and in the exchange of stocks, bonds, and, indeed, futures. Space and time lost their anchoring and securing attributes as they appeared to grow increasingly scarce and tyrannical in the single-minded pursuit of greater productivity. It was within this climate that Albert Einstein developed the theory of relativity (1911) and that abstract art flourished, both of which emphasized multiple perspectives as opposed to a single one. This shift—which modern architecture shared (see below)—might be understood as a reflection of rapid change, as a means of acknowledging cultural diversity, or as an expression of rapid movement in a train or car.

The vast and rapid transformations occurring since the late nineteenth century have led observers to remark that the only secure thing about modernity is insecurity.³⁶ Charles Pierre Baudelaire, a participant/observer of late-nineteenth-century Paris, wrote in "The Painter of Modern Life" (1863), "Modernity is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable."³⁷ Invoking Karl Marx, Marshall Berman described modernity one century hence as

a unity of disunity; it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, all that is solid melts into air.³⁸

What has been described as an institutional revolution occurred over the course of the nineteenth century, featuring not only the separation and formalization of different aspects of life—work, home, leisure, shopping, recreation—but also that of knowledge into the academic "disciplines," and the professionalization of many activities and areas of knowledge. By the early part of the twentieth century, there was a shift from merely organizing the masses of people, knowledge, and objects (in prisons, libraries, museums, maps) to a more concerted effort to understand and control them. These efforts included the emergence of the social sciences as

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academic disciplines, of urban planning as a profession, and of modern architecture and planning theory.

Since the rapid changes in the physical fabric of the industrial city were unlike the incremental piecemeal interventions into the preindustrial city, new kinds of specialists were needed to decipher the changes and to effectively guide them. To fulfill this need, social reformers refashioned themselves into social scientists and urban planners who attempted, in the words of Paul Rabinow, to "link norms and forms."³⁹ What distinguished modern urban planning from that which preceded it was its scale and its effort to contend with industrialization, in part by "normalizing" the population.⁴⁰ In the United States, these efforts were apparent in the City Efficient plans devised by the newly formed city planning commissions around the country; in France, in the plans of the Musée Social; Le Corbusier, Tony Garnier, and Henri Sellier; and in England, in the efforts to realize Ebenezer Howard's Garden City concept.

Modern architecture and planning theory was codified in the Athens Charter (written by Le Corbusier based on discussions at the CIAM—International Congress of Modern Architecture—convened in 1933) to include the separation and organization of functions (habitation, work, recreation, circulation) through zoning regulations, a regional plan, and measurements derived from the human body. Modern architecture and planning theory generally reconceived the "relationship between residence, work, and commerce, and between market and marketplace"⁴¹ recommending, for instance, that sports replace the public activity of streets and that collective services replace private ones.

This undertaking was to be carried out by experts with the assistance of modern technologies in an effort "to transform society by forging new forms of collective associations and personal habits, and by precluding those considered undesirable."⁴² The appropriate role of the architect followed from these intentions. The modern era, says Jean Guilleux, saw

the emergence of an Architect with the desire to take in hand the salvation of humanity, a radically new role with the stated aim of transforming the conditions of

life emanating from the apparently anarchic and cancerous development of towns from the industrial revolution. . . . Neither Vitruvius, Alberti, nor Perrault had envisaged for an instant that their science would extend beyond its limits.⁴³

For modern architects of the early twentieth century, however, "The project was total: art, politics, housing, the territorial and social aspects of life, everything in fact." For them,

The supposed model inhabitant was particularly basic: his needs were evidently primary. Above all he had no desires and certainly no fantasies. Transparent, he was also universal, whatever his culture, age, sex, or profession. His size, his gestures in the kitchen were coded. Art was transformed into an anthropometric laboratory.

Architects were designing for an ideal man rather than for real people and were seeking to discover universal solutions. They aspired toward the architectural object, a building that stands alone and does not refer to its particular setting either physically or socially. Although this concept was not new—Leone Battista Alberti, Andrea Palladio, and others also designed architectural objects—the assertion that all building types should exist as isolated objects was new.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, city designers such as Ebenezer Howard, Tony Garnier, and Le Corbusier proposed "ideal types" that could be applied anywhere rather than specific plans appropriate for specific sites. The French architect Bernard Huet explains that the "functional" city was conceived as a

space of Euclidean abstraction regulated by quantity and industrial repetition, a space whose three fundamental characteristics are homogeneity, isotropy, and fragmentation, and which presents itself as the absolute antithesis of the space of the "historic" city. The model of the "functional" city is the most accomplished expression of a "scientific" urbanism which progressively detached itself from the practices of urban art at the beginning of the twentieth century and whose exclusive object is the rational administration of housing the masses in industrial society.⁴⁵

Modern housing was to consist of "buildings sited in the middle of continuous open spaces, transparent glass facades, [and] gardens on rooftops"⁴⁶ situated among avenues without intersection. Modern interior design supplanted the central hallway and multiple, small, single-function rooms of the Victorian house with "open plans," "flowing space," and fewer but more capacious rooms. The modernist opening up of interior space, made possible by steel frames eliminating the need for structural walls, reflected a desire to be released from traditional societal mores and barriers among social classes, ethnic groups, generations, and genders. It corresponded to the mass ownership of cars in the United States along with massive road building and, as Vincent Scully suggests, reflected the American love of movement.⁴⁷ Subsequent to the Second World War, it corresponded to a

period of affluence that allowed more people than ever before to own their homes and to enjoy larger living spaces. These conditions encouraged the pursuit of opened, undefined, flowing interior space in the modern house by architects and nonarchitects alike. Modern decor sought to simplify that of the late nineteenth century in order to save on the costs of decorating and the housework it required, to express a more egalitarian as opposed to hierarchical spirit, and to reflect the new aesthetic of minimalism, or "less is more."

Regarding the academic eclecticism of the Beaux-Arts tradition as no longer evocative or symbolic of its time, modernism employed imagery related to machinery, reflecting a faith in technology and a desire to create a technocratic utopia. The machine provided a suitable organizing metaphor in the quest to contend with the disruptions and apparent disorder of industrialism. Anthony Vidler suggests that this metaphor grew out of the need to confront mass production, especially the mass production of machines by machines. Tracing the evolution of modernist thought, Vidler writes

The natural analogy of the Enlightenment, originally brought forward to control the messy reality of the city, was now extended to refer to the control of entire nature.... A vision of Taylorized production, of a world ruled by the iron law of Ford supplanted the spuriously golden dream of neo-classicism.⁴⁸

With the growth of corporate capitalism after the Second World War, the international power system grew relatively stable and so did beliefs in linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning. The eighth CIAM (held in London in 1945) took the Athens Charter to its logical extreme in declaring that industrialization had rendered social categories irrelevant. Participants in this conference, organized by José Luis Sert with the theme "The Heart of the City," declared that the industrial mode of production had reduced everyone to *homo economicus*, yielding a monolithic mass society with widely shared aspirations and tastes. This conception of society at "degree zero" (from Roland Barthes) further justified a design mentality that aspired to be pure, sterile, avant-garde, elitist, and esoteric. Manfredo Tafuri points out that this period—often described as universal or high modernism—was characterized by a desire to control the future and thereby eliminate the risk that comes with it, not unlike the contemporaneous Keynesian economics.⁴⁹

An unintended side effect of this mentality, however, was the unprecedented influence it allowed the market in shaping cultural forms of expression, including urban design. Frederic Jameson contends, "The new utopianism of high modernism unwittingly and against the very spirit of its revolutionary and utopian affirmations prepared the terrain for the omnipotence of the fully 'rationalized'

technocratic plan, for the universal planification of what was to become the total system of multinational capital."⁵⁰ This period of modernism, he says, "ended up rationalizing the object world more extensively and ferociously than anything Ford or Taylor might have done on his own momentum."⁵¹ More than ever before, form was following finance.

The co-option of urban design by the growing reach and power of the market was epitomized in the United States by the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 and the Highway Act of 1954. Lobbied for by real-estate, building, and automotive interests, these acts allowed for massive suburbanization along vehicular patterns and the appropriation of urban design by developers. A symposium held at the Museum of Modern Art in 1947 called "What Is Happening to Modern Architecture?" also revealed the technocratic bias of high modernism. Ridiculing recent regionalist design in the Bay Area, participants in this symposium called for returning to essentialist modernism with Le Corbusier's Radiant City as the universal model.⁵²

As a result, much of what was built after the war in the United States—as well as western Europe—consisted of isolated towers and slabs as well as unending blocks of mass-produced individual houses. Informed by market dictates as well as by modern architecture and urban planning theory, this massive amount of postwar building has been widely accused of destroying much of western urban heritage, disrupting communities and displacing people from their homes and businesses, increasing social segregation on a regional scale, accentuating gender role distinctions and disfavoring that of women, diminishing the public realm, being insensitive to the environment, and generating aesthetic monotony. Although modern urbanism may have been elegant and socially responsible in the abstract, its realization, as Edward T. Relph contends, "turned out to be repressive, ugly, sterile, antisocial, and generally disliked."⁵³

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the critique of modern urbanism began to mount. In its dogmatic insistence on purity, critics proclaimed, modernism bespoke its own death. The various expressions of discontent with architectural and planning training and practice registered during the 1960s attested to the severity of the crisis.⁵⁴

Postmodern Fear and Postmodern Urbanism

The more recent wave of confusion and uncertainty beginning in the late 1960s may be attributed to yet another acceleration in the rate of change as globalization, specialization, and geographic mobility have continued apace. Other contributors to the peculiarly postmodern sense of insecurity include the virtual

eclipse of the public realm, the growing encroachment of the marketplace and the state into the private realm, the shift to flexible accumulation, the growing gap between rich and poor, increased access to information technologies and influence of intelligent machines; the consequent obscuring of power, and the resultant challenge to the dominance of the modern world view.⁵⁵ The fear factor has certainly grown, as indicated by the growth in locked car and house doors and security systems, the popularity of "gated" or "secure" communities for all age and income groups, and the increasing surveillance of public spaces (see below), not to mention the unending reports of danger emitted by the mass media.

Whereas modern fear and the positivistic climate in which it occurred led to efforts to detect causes and effects—to rationally understand the present in an effort to guide the future—postmodern fear amid the reigning anti-technocratic climate has incited a series of closely related and overlapping responses including retribalization, nostalgia, escapism, and spiritual (re)turn.

The search for "roots" and the assertion of cultural distinctions have been predominant responses to postmodern insecurity. As Marshall McLuhan correctly foresaw in the 1960s, the world village engendered by the widespread use of electronic media has diminished actual diversity while also provoking a distrust of distant authority and a desire for "in-depth" participation, along with regionalist, separatist, fundamentalist, and reactionary sentiments. Parallel to a growing cosmopolitanism, this desire to preserve (or invent) differences—or "retribalization"—has been assisted by transnational culture flows of products, capital, people, and ideas, as well as media. In urban design, the retribalization reflex is manifest in attempts to design in the growth of retirement communities as well as other de facto segregated communities (by ethnicity or social class).

A second response to the accelerated change of the contemporary period has been nostalgia, a desire to return to an apocryphal rosy past in reaction to high modernism's clean break from the past. An obsession with the past is interpreted psychologically as a desire to return to the womb, to the mother, to nature, to archetypes, to some paradise or state of bliss that has been lost. In its collective manifestation, the nostalgic impulse might be understood as a response to the rapid change that occurred during the industrial/modern era. In the transition to a postindustrial society, the sense of insecurity grew along with the nostalgic impulse.⁵⁶ This late-twentieth-century version added an infatuation with mass culture and its imagery in yet another effort to find meaning and security in a world that appeared increasingly meaningless and scary.⁵⁷ The massive appropriation and recombining of already existing ideas or images may suggest a depletion of creative energies or a fear of being original.

Joining retribalization, then, another response to the growing encroachment of the marketplace and the state into our private domain has been the return to "traditional" values and institutions, a return that was appropriated and assisted by the advertising industry, which dubbed it "neotraditionalism." A full-page advertisement placed in the *New York Times* for the magazine *Good Housekeeping* in 1989 explained that neotraditionalism was "now being recognized as the most powerful social movement since the sixties." The new traditionalist, this ad implied, is a housewife and mother, perhaps with a career, who believes in "timeless quality" and "commitment" and who is "simple, honest, real, unpretentious, and genuine." A similar advertisement explains that the new traditionalist

started a revolution—with some not-so revolutionary ideals. She was searching for something to believe in—and look what she found. Her husband, her children, her home, herself. She's the contemporary woman who has made a new commitment to the traditional values that some people thought were "old-fashioned." She wasn't following a trend. She made her own choices. But when she looked over the fence she found that she wasn't alone.⁵⁸


In other realms, the desire for familiarity—recalling one's own childhood or even someone else's—and the exhaustion of creative energies are evident in the popularity of Nickelodeon cable network's "Nick at Nite," which rebroadcasts 1960s and 1970s sitcoms for the twenty- and thirty-something crowds; feature films based on popular television programs; movie remakes and sequels; new covers of old songs; advertising that attempts to make products seem old or established; "classic rock" stations; lounge music and old nightclubs; retro-clothing and retro-furniture; diners; and much more. These allusions can reassure continuity, can be a homage, or can be a high-camp parody.

The nostalgic impulse has been evident in music as well, as jazz began a hard-bop revival and rock and folk referred back to their earlier incarnations. Perhaps most significantly, country music, that quintessentially American musical genre, has made a major comeback. As this rural nation became a suburban one, country music also suburbanized, so to speak. Subsequent to the de-twanging of country music in the 1970s, which record producers called "countrypolitan," there was an effort to "sound old-fashioned" in the 1980s, which producers described as "neotraditionalist." Played with guitars and fiddles, this neotraditionalist country music recalls a time "when life was simple and roles and choices were clear." Its lyrics, distinct from traditional country lyrics that console their listener in hard times, look "to the past through rose-colored binoculars," using this idealized past as just one more comfy stage set. In fact, two of these neotraditionalist songs are entitled "Home" (by Alan Jackson and by Joe Diffie).⁵⁹

Enhanced access to material goods through increasingly sophisticated means of production and distribution (particularly home shopping via catalogues and television) has put a premium on having something before anyone else has it. Being able to purchase an item that is fashionable no longer carries the cache that having already had it before it was fashionable does. Retailers have accommodated this fascination for the old by resurrecting past styles and by "wearing out" new goods in a mass-produced fashion through, for instance, multiple washings of clothes or special finishes on furniture or picture frames. To give new things the aged look, a salesperson explained, their "paint finishes intentionally show signs of wear and aging."⁶⁰ Explaining this sensibility, a shopowner asserted that these items represent "nostalgia for the simple life," and another maintained, "I feel that esthetic is more important than authentic."⁶¹

This infatuation with the past has made renovation of old houses a popular pastime. It has also translated into a nostalgia towards both city and country life and an aversion to suburban life. Although the actual number of people renovating old houses is small, their impact has been significant in gentrifying both urban areas and rural communities. The retrofitting of vacated factories and warehouses for housing has also contributed to this gentrification. Such "loft living" is another example of valorizing the past, but this time it is the industrial past. And it represents nostalgia not only for an old building but also an old way of life, that of combining home and workplace in one space. Although architects such as Frank Lloyd Wright, Walter Gropius, and Le Corbusier were greatly inspired by industrial design, they adapted it for residential buildings by prettifying it (with their female clientele in mind) and adjusting its scale appropriately. It was not until the 1970s that industrial design began to appear in nonindustrial markets in a less-disguised fashion, suggesting a changed aesthetic that reflected a quest for authenticity, efficiency, and beauty without artifice. The search for a more human habitat, Sharon Zukin deftly observed, turned to factories.⁶² Ever solicitous to consumer desires, some developers began offering new constructions that resemble old industrial buildings and merchandising them as "new lofts."

As the housing stock was being gentrified, so was the retail sector, either in a piecemeal fashion or through larger-scale interventions. James Rouse, the developer of the 1960s new town of Columbia, Maryland, was most influential in this "adaptive reuse" of abandoned downtown districts. In the late 1970s he oversaw the conversion of Boston's Faneuil Hall Market Place (originally built in 1742) and its adjacent Quincy Market (built in 1826) into a new kind of urban shopping mall combining shops, restaurants, small-cart boutiques, and performance spaces. Rouse thus introduced the new typology of the "festival marketplace," which, in



Disneyland
Anaheim, California




CityWalk at Universal Studios
Los Angeles, California



Two Rodeo Drive
Beverly Hills, California
Kaplan McLaughlin Diaz Architects/Planners



Two Rodeo Drive



Gatehouse of a gated community
Boca Raton, Florida



Grand entryway of house
Cincinnati, Ohio

the words of Benjamin Thompson, the architect for several of these, were to be "settings for festive human interaction, made of food and clothes as well as buildings."⁶³ Quincy Market was followed by various implementations of the same formula including Lawrence Halprin's conversion of a former chocolate factory into Ghirardelli Square in San Francisco (1964), and Benjamin Thompson's building (from scratch) of Harborplace in Baltimore (1980) and the South Street Seaport in New York City (1983-85). This so-called "urban revitalization" usually entails a partnership between the public and private sectors. The goal is to generate new economic base and to generate a renewed sense of pride in downtowns, but the actual results are uneven.

On the scale of the city, the nostalgic impulse is revealed by numerous efforts since the 1970s to recreate preindustrial townscapes and to plan settings that appear to have evolved spontaneously and that encourage inhabitant appropriation. It was the "illegible" quality of post-wwii urban development and the fear this generated that incited efforts to create more familiar "legible" landscapes.⁶⁴ Usually, these design strategies involved combining the human scale of traditional townscapes with the benefits of contemporary technologies.⁶⁵

Nostalgic urban design has been most evident in neotraditional urbanism, more recently christened the "new urbanism." Dissatisfied with the conventional post-wwii suburban tract development as well as the master-planned and gated communities that succeeded them, neotraditional urbanism draws inspiration from townscapes of the past in an effort to engage the surroundings rather than retreat from them. In order to achieve this, neotraditional urbanism seeks to provide quality public spaces that are semienclosed and legible, and that connect places that people use, in contrast to the amorphous, illegible, isolated, and largely unused public spaces of the master-planned community. It is hoped that these measures, rather than increase the fortress mentality and fear, will alleviate the sources of insecurity themselves. The central motivation behind these efforts is to avoid modern urbanism's excessive separation of functions along with the social and environmental harm that accompanies it. Though inspired by preindustrial environments, these urban designs seek to acknowledge current needs and tastes—including the preference for the individual house—and to take full advantage of new technologies for achieving these ends. Efforts along these lines have been undertaken in Europe beneath the rubric of the movement for the reconstruction of the European city⁶⁶ and in the United States under the titles of "traditional neighborhood development" or "district" (introduced and diffused foremost by Elisabeth Plater-Zyberk and Andres Duany) and "pedestrian pocket" or "transit-oriented development" (as promulgated primarily by Peter Calthorpe).⁶⁷

Paralleling the urbanistic trend to create enclosed "roomlike" public spaces, postmodern interior design has marked a return to separate rooms with specific purposes.⁶⁸ The perennial search to expand markets by diversifying products offers one explanation for this shift, but there are more substantial reasons as well. During the 1970s post-wwii baby boomers were reaching childbearing age at the same time that a fiscal crisis restricted new construction, thus producing cramped living spaces, the partitioning of spaces, and the need for greater privacy. In addition, new home technologies (particularly the vcr and computer) and growing privatism have conspired with a diminished public realm to make people stay home more. With increased time at home, and the need to engage in a greater number of activities there, we have returned to nineteenth-century uni-functional rooms. This time, however, the production rooms (for canning, sewing, wood-working) are supplanted by rooms for consumption, leisure, and recreation, such as the media room, the exercise room, room-size closets, and large master bedroom suites to incorporate features such as Jacuzzis and saunas. On a more abstract level, this return to the room can be attributed to a loss of faith in progress (expressed symbolically in the modernist open plan) and to the sense that we lack an overarching organizing myth (or *grand récit*), both of which in turn incite a nostalgia for more traditional living spaces.

Despite the new technologies integral to contemporary homes, postmodern house forms and decor draw from the past, both an urban leisured past and rural past of "abundant simplicity." In contrast to the starkness of modern home design, certain postmodern homes are opulent and sumptuous, featuring, for instance, grand entryways, double staircases, chandeliers, scattered mirrors with gilt frames, overstuffed furniture, and the layering of fabrics, rugs, and window coverings, all in colors and patterns popular prior to modernism. Other postmodern homes, inspired by "country living," incorporate wood furnishings that are distressed, combination living room/kitchens, small-floral-print fabrics, and other characteristics of rural houses. Others still combine these aesthetics and more to produce a grandmother's house/flea market/pop culture/anything goes aesthetic. Fantasy is back, supplanting the modern concern for function, purism, and structural "honesty." This shift in interior design is illustrated by French designer Andrée Putman's 1996 redesign of Manhattan's Morgan Hotel—which she first designed in 1984 in a high-tech and minimal style using black leather, gray, and white—in what she describes as her "no color" color scheme, featuring antique armchairs with well-worn leather in the lobby, corduroy chairs and wool sofas in beige-on-beige guest rooms, and bar stools of wood from fallen Central Park trees for the basement bar.⁶⁹