

Whereas the opening up of spaces in the modern house reflected a desire to break with the past, the partitioning of spaces in the postmodern house perhaps reflects a desire to rekindle the past. If the opening up of spaces engendered a sense of emptiness, void, and meaningless, the partitioning of them would perhaps bring meaning back. And if the flowing space suggested and facilitated the elimination of social differences, perhaps enclosed space would vindicate and reassert these distinctions during a time of pervasive insecurity. A place for everything and everything in its place. Nonetheless, the trend has not been towards recreating premodern interior spaces wholesale, but towards a best-of-both-worlds compromise between these and the modernist open plan, particularly for the kitchen, living room, and dining room areas.

This partitioning of domestic space has paralleled a larger partitioning of urban space, as retribalization and nostalgia have lent renewed vigor to traditional identity markers. The reassertion of national, regional, ethnic, and political boundaries and groupings (especially evident during the Persian Gulf War and in the war in the Balkans) suggest that history has not in fact ended—that we have not transcended the dueling dualisms characterizing modernity—as Francis Fukuyama postulated.<sup>70</sup> Such expressions of the need to anchor ourselves in time and space in order to withstand universalizing forces is reminiscent of the “geopolitical” reflexes of the 1930s. Martin Heidegger, for instance, called for “rootedness in place and environmentally bound traditions as the only secure foundation for political and social action in a manifestly troubled world.”<sup>71</sup>

A third response to contemporary fear is escapism, characterized either by a retreat from the larger community (privatism) or a flight into collective or personal fantasy worlds that actively disregard the problems of real life, or what cyberists refer to in shorthand as “RL.” Retreating and fleeing are reactions to the blurring of public and private realms, the continued decline of meaningful public space, and the resultant fragmentation of city life and city form. As Kathleen Stewart writes,

There is no clear “inside” or “outside” anymore, no private and public spheres of life. We build public space as fantasy environments to roam around in—malls, theme parks, every town modeled as a postmodern village of the imagination... “the country” becomes just an urban space with more room.<sup>72</sup>

Kenneth Galbraith has described this condition as one of “private affluence and public squalor.”<sup>73</sup> Richard Sennett attributes the decline of the public realm to changes “that began with the fall of the *ancien régime* and the formation of a new capitalist, secular, urban culture.”<sup>74</sup> He explores the psychological implications of this decline, saying,

Western societies are moving from something like an other-directed condition to an inner-directed condition—except that in the midst of self-absorption no one can say what is inside. As a result, confusion has arisen between public and intimate life.

This self-absorption, he says, “obscures the continuing importance of class in advanced industrial society” and leads us “to undervalue the community relations of strangers, particularly those which occur in cities.”

The French philosopher Jérôme Bindé maintains that the widespread desire to live in an individual house can be understood in the context of

the postmodern moment where everyone is returned to himself. To his little games, to the scenery of his daily life, to his narcissistic anxiety of “being liberated.”... The individuals of societies in crisis, disoriented by the sudden devaluation of unanimous credos (capitalist “abundance” or socialist “emancipation”) become thus refugees in a rediscovered opium, in this padlocked garden where one would like to forget the snubs of real History.<sup>75</sup>

Privatization, Bindé maintains, involves “the search for stability in an unstable and anxious universe, without imaginary landmarks to anchor oneself;” “the simulated regression towards the past, evoked like a maternal and appeasing specter which one knows very well no longer exists, never existed, but in which one would very much like to believe.” He says,

A little like the Carnivals used to suspend... sexual prohibitions and social hierarchies, our collective postmodern rites ritually raise the prohibitions to guide and favor the privatization of existence. But at the same time they confirm and reinforce the narcissistic and anxious insularity of this individual sphere, always frustrated, always unsatisfied.

For Bindé, privatization is not

the adventuresome conquest of a mode of civilization along with new relations of production. Far from being a conquest, or an offensive ideological arm of the avant-garde and social revolution, this privatism functions like a refuge, a retreat, a redoubt whence the aggressivity of [those] who defend it.

Those ardent proponents of the free-market economy will not achieve the minimum state intervention they seek, says Bindé, “but its opposite: maximum state intervention... and maximum bureaucracy” through the expansion of the military-industrial complex and of transnational corporations.

The impulse to privatize is epitomized by the growth of gated communities, residential developments with patrolled entryways and a clear separation from other neighborhoods, usually by a secure fence. The clear spatial and social distinctions provided by the gated community have replaced the erstwhile clear social distinction provided by “vertical segregation”—which became blurred with

the advent of the elevator, making all floors equally desirable—with horizontal segregation. The number and size of these socially homogenous ghettos has expanded as mass transit has become more extensive. This segregation allows a certain ignorance regarding social differences, which, in turn, allows for the generation of myths, and negative stereotypes about people who are not familiar.

Privatism is also manifest in the appropriation of public spaces by private agencies. Such spaces are found in the inward-turning shopping mall, which has abandoned the central city for the suburbs and whose fortresslike exterior surrounded by a moatlike parking lot turns its back entirely on its surroundings. Other examples include the indoor “atriums” of corporate office buildings; theme parks in which “Main Street” and other recognizable features of the past are reproduced at seven-eighths their actual scale, scrubbed clean of their real contexts, and commercialized; and franchises and chain stores that offer consumers familiarity wherever they may be.

All of these places are patrolled by sophisticated security systems, which largely influence their design as well as regulate who enters and what activities transpire there. In these more recent forms of public space, participation is singularly focused (as opposed to the diverse roles of traditional public spaces) and almost always consumer oriented, limited to those with the ability to purchase.

Older public spaces have also been appropriated and controlled through increases in the signage designating who should be using the space and when (“We have the right to refuse service to anyone”), in curfews and police sweeps in transportation terminals and parks, in both public and private police forces, in gating, and in the antigrowth mentality. While certain parks, plazas, and commons remain places to escape from loci of production and consumption, their traditional social component invariably has been compromised, because the rising tide of fear has transformed them into controlled and guarded places. These so-called “public” spaces have become places of exclusion as well as inclusion.

Michel Foucault’s concept of disciplinary space offers one interpretation of this evolution. Foucault posited that evolving technologies of power serve to maintain the status quo. Based on the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political rationality of *raison d’état*, “biopower” began to inform the disciplinary technologies employed by elites.<sup>76</sup> For the exercise of biopower, visibility was essential. Spectacles of terror and punishment as well as those of patronage and benevolence acted as a kind of “natural policing.”<sup>77</sup> To enhance visibility and to organize individuals in space, architects and their clients designed buildings and cities accordingly. As disciplinary strategies have evolved to the present, visibility of the ruled has continued to increase, but that of the rulers has decreased. This is

because, as Foucault remarked, “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.”<sup>78</sup> This evolution was foreshadowed by Bentham’s Panopticon, described above, which is widely regarded as the paradigmatic example of disciplinary space.

As the expression and exercise of power has become less and less visible over the last few centuries, its influence has become more difficult to discern . . . and to resist. Whereas the plaza—or *place* in French—brought displays of power to the public until the nineteenth century, today’s *place*-lessness renders the exercise of power more elusive and thus insidious. It is everywhere and nowhere, assumed ubiquitous or, alternatively, assumed absent.

On the urban scale, this new ordering of power is manifest in a sort of centrifugal urbanism—a movement out of central cities. One example of such defensive, disciplinary, or escapist urbanism is the splintering of the Parisian university in the wake of the student uprisings of May 1968. The university was not only factioned into a number of smaller ones, but many of these were located outside of the central city and designed to incorporate little or no public space for spontaneous—or even planned—student gatherings. A concurrent French example is the building of five new cities in the outer suburbs of Paris, which both gentrify Paris and mollify the radical politics of the inner suburbs. A parallel example in the United States, though initiated by the private sector, is the massive movement of corporate headquarters from central cities to more controlled suburban “office parks” or “corporate campuses” (allowing management better control of labor) as well as the “edge cities” of which they form an integral part.

Disciplinary space is also encountered on a smaller scale in, for instance, atrium buildings, which could be regarded as evolved heirs to the Panopticon where the center is occupied by a void rather than a supervisor. One such example is New York University’s Bobst Library (designed by Philip Johnson in 1972), in which the void discourages improper behavior, whether the stealing and abuse of books or physical assaults. The erstwhile supervisor is rendered superfluous as library users become their own guardians. This disciplinary strategy is less blatant than earlier ones, and so are the disciplinary agents. Is it the architect, the client (NYU), or library users who are exercising the control?

The exercise of power today, then, is disguised and difficult to identify because it is not localized, because its agents are rarely self-aware, because it is largely internalized, and because it therefore goes largely unnoticed. The elusive quality of power has made people feel like ever smaller and insignificant cogs in a giant machine whose workings are incomprehensible. As our sense of control over

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our world has diminished, our fear of the unknown and unpredictable "other"—variously defined—has grown, leading to distrust, paranoia, and the proliferation of racism, hate crimes, neo-Nazism, and other xenophobias. As Alberto Moravia has pointed out, we have become terrorists as well as terrorized.<sup>79</sup> In the end, a growing perception of greater equality among people both nationwide and worldwide—plied largely by the various mass media—accompanies and legitimizes growing inequalities.

Consequently, rather than nip the sources of fear in the bud, the more common reflex has been avoidance and self-protection. Activities that once occurred in the public realm have been usurped by more private realms as leisure activities, entertainment, information centers, and consumer services are increasingly accessible from home via the television or computer, or, if one leaves home, in the strictly controlled uni-functional settings of the shopping mall, theme park, or variants thereof. The contemporary built environment contains increasingly less meaningful public space, and existing public space is increasingly controlled by various forms of surveillance and increasingly invested with private meanings.

The other kind of escapism—that into fantasy worlds—is most obvious perhaps in the rapidly expanded possibilities for networking on line and its potential for identity creation. This is exemplified by the "cyberdelic counterculture," for whom the computer is specifically regarded as a means for escaping from the humdrum of everyday life.<sup>80</sup> The ability to "reside" in virtual space and multi-user dungeons (MUDs) allows for multiple (virtual) identities. Such experimentation with other identities, worlds, and ecosystems can potentially assist the search for solutions to contemporary problems (through, for instance, software programs such as SIM-City and SIM-Earth), but it can also contribute to blurring the real and the virtual, a fragmentation of the personality, and an overabundance of options that ultimately discourage engagement with the real world.<sup>81</sup>

This kind of space is also apparent in the more passive relationship with the television screen, which Americans watch an average of six hours per day. While the amount of time people spend watching TV has grown, program content ironically has become increasingly "reality-based," with situation dramas, news magazines, and talk shows that portray something approximating the "Real World," which happens to be the title of a popular cable program that ostensibly records everyday lives without scripting. Movie studios have been capitalizing on our obsession with insecurity by producing such films as *Primal Fear* (Paramount Pictures), which, at the time of this writing, is number one at the box office, and *Fear* (Universal Pictures). Booksellers, meanwhile, report that consumers are in "pursuit of safety" in their selection of reading material. As a result, "celebrity-driven" books—which are written by people who are already known or which have a TV or movie tie-in—are by far leading the sales pack. In the June 1996 *Publishers Weekly*, for instance, the best-selling nonfiction book was by basketball star Dennis Rodman, and four books based on the TV hit "The X-Files" were selling briskly.<sup>82</sup> "Formula-driven" books, whether suspense, horror, adventure, romance, or self-help, are also key to satisfying consumers' pursuit of safety.

With our hold on reality and our sense of community increasingly tenuous, it seems that we devote our more traditional moments of escapism (reading, watching TV and movies) to living out our fears in the safety of home or cinema, to seeking answers, or to generating a sense of community—a group of significant others—who may be fictional characters or people we will never meet. Our sense of adventure unabated, but frustrated by our fear of engaging in the real world, we turn to the screen (both interactive and passive) to learn about how other people in other places contend with the vicissitudes of life.

The escapist reflex results in two opposing tacks of self-presentation, that of display and that of concealment. In clothing fashion, the desire to conceal oneself is evident in the vogue for baggy clothing that not only conceals one's body, but, potentially, one's sex, ethnicity, and social class. In contrast, the body-hugging, skin-baring styles allowed by synthetic fabrics such as lycra display one's strength and prowess for combating the *Blade Runner* world out there. The popularity of body modification—through body building, plastic surgery, piercing, and tattooing—enhances this image while blurring the distinction between what is natural and what is created, between human and machine. This fascination with cyborgs could be construed as a means of contending with the fear of increasingly intelligent and influential machines. Meanwhile, the popularity of the four-wheel-drive road warrior vehicle, especially in cities, expresses both the desire to conceal oneself and to display one's strength and power. This is epitomized by the Hollywood

vogue for the HUMVEE (human military vehicle), which was recently released in a civilian edition called the Hummer, available for \$45,000–\$75,000. Arnold Swwarzenegger purchased the very first one. While the Hummer may be “the ultimate in body armor,”<sup>83</sup> the safety value of all cars today is a major selling point and covers a wide range of options from alarms to car phones, built-in car seats for children, and unbreakable glass.<sup>84</sup>

Like clothing and cars, homes also aspire to conceal and display. Sometimes a single feature, such as an elaborately appointed gateway that conceals what is inside while displaying the residents’ ability to do so, accomplishes both. Other means for displaying strength and prowess include signage warning trespassers not to enter and/or indicating “armed response” to intruders, turnstiles in housing projects, and ostentatious facades and front yards. Means for concealing include squatting in abandoned buildings, building shantytowns from discarded materials on abandoned lots, and, of course, constructing fences and barriers of all kinds. For the poor, such strategies can be resourceful and creative means for improving lives. For the rich, they may represent “stealth wealth,” a desire to hide one’s possessions during a time when the gap between rich and poor continues to grow.

Joining home decorating’s fascination with the past has been a fascination with other cultures, or the exotic. This appropriation of other times and places in one’s own home staves off the boredom of sameness through adventure in the unknown while, at the same time, taming this strangeness through artful placement and unique usage of artifacts. More cynically, it provides by association a showplace for displaying one’s travel experience, discriminating eye, and power of purchase.

Outside the home, the escapist reflex is apparent in the growth of leisure and recreational industries and in the increased building of megastructures such as theme parks, stadiums, and convention centers. It is also apparent in the centrifugal urbanism described above: the continuing residential suburbanization (despite gentrification) as well as the movement of company headquarters away from central cities and efforts to recreate a sense of urbanity within them. In the late 1970s, for instance, Kevin Roche designed the General Foods Headquarters in Rye, New York to include “office neighborhoods” and a “Main Street” with newsstands and a restaurant. In the arguably non-urban city of Los Angeles, a number of recent office complexes, such as the one designed by Frank Israel for Propaganda Films, aspire to bring the city into the workplace instead of vice versa.<sup>85</sup> The apotheosis of escapist urbanism is found in the proliferation of “edge cities” during the 1980s, abnegations of the central city and the unique quality of life it promised.

Among architects, the escapist tendency has been manifest since the 1970s in the preoccupation with facadism and photogenic design as well as in a design attitude that abnegates social responsibility. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre have described this tendency as “narcissistic,” suggesting “an act of regression due to acute frustration”<sup>86</sup> with the prevalent urban design approaches of the 1960s. This narcissistic turn, they contend, reacts to the naive attitudes of scientism and populism and disregards or denies context entirely. Instead it is preoccupied with the purely visual features of architecture (formalism), the fascination with the evocative power of drawings and models (“graphism”), the tendency to view design solely as an object of gratification (hedonism), the conviction that the architect is the supreme judge of the quality of the built environment (elitism), and the rejection of the functionalist aesthetic as well as the very idea of function itself (anti-functionalism).<sup>87</sup> This tendency led Ada Louise Huxtable to exclaim,

The most fundamental change in architecture today is one of attitude. Scratch a postmodernist and you will find an apostle of architecture for art’s sake, something that would have had any respectable and responsible architect drummed out of the profession not too long ago. . . . With the renunciation of traditional social responsibilities as beyond his capacities or control, the architect has finally been freed to pursue style exclusively and openly. . . . without apology or disguise.<sup>88</sup>

An outcome of this tendency has been the production of “hyperreal” environments comprised of “simulacra.” Jean Baudrillard applied the term “simulacra” to describe the generation by models of a real without origin or reality, a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory—PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA—it is the map that engenders the territory.<sup>89</sup>

Simulation, as distinct from resemblance, has no original or referent, for the model replaces the real “as exemplified in such phenomena as the ideal home in women’s or lifestyle magazines, ideal sex as portrayed in sex manuals or relationship books, ideal fashion as exemplified in ads or fashion shows,”<sup>90</sup> and so on. With hyperreality, the simulations come to constitute reality, leading to what Baudrillard has called “the death of the subject.” When something is produced artificially such as a simulated environment (Disneyland being the prototype), it does not come to be regarded as “unreal, or surreal, but realer-than-real, a real retouched and refurbished.”<sup>91</sup>

A hyperreality does not even have any pretense to accurately recall a particular past or place, but to produce an environment that transcends its sources of inspiration. As Umberto Eco explains, hyperreal environments must be absolutely fake in order to be better than anything real.<sup>92</sup> David Harvey has observed that

in theme parks "it is now possible to experience the world's geography vicariously, as a simulacrum," in a way that conceals "almost perfectly any trace of origin, of the labor processes that produced them, or of the social relations implicated in their production."<sup>93</sup> In a contemporary—and somehow unnerving—twist, these simulacra have become reality, particularly via mass media and theme parks, since many more people visit the simulacra of Africa and China presented in Disney World than actually visit these foreign lands, and for them the simulacra are Africa and China more than the far-off places themselves. Daniel Solomon has astutely observed, "If history were the victim of the first generation of post-war development, reality was the victim of the second."<sup>94</sup>

Much of our postmodern landscape, then, can be considered "hyperreal," particularly master-planned communities, shopping malls, theme parks, and entertainment palaces. Some of these are commendable for the quality of life they offer, the quality of their architecture and urbanism, their level of showmanship, and the opportunities they provide for relaxation and good times. But the existence of such hyperreal environments side by side with places of desperation and people who are unable to share in the hyperreal benefits certainly engenders shame, resentment, and fear in the haves and have-nots alike. To the extent that these fantasy worlds disguise real problems and thereby diminish the potential for resolving them, they contribute to exacerbating them.<sup>95</sup> In addition, the "search for a fantasy world, the illusory 'high' that takes us beyond current realities into pure imagination"<sup>96</sup> can distract architects and urban designers from the actual program. This is apparent in some buildings by "starchitects" and their epigones, works that blatantly ignore client requests, including budget constraints, and elevate fiction, finesse, and fantasy above function.

The deconstructivist trend in architecture, so critical of the escapist tendency of postmodern urban design, has attempted to express the messiness of the contemporary world. But deconstructivism's lack of a social agenda, its extreme cynicism, as well as its consequent coziness with elite benefactors have conspired to produce the ultimate architecture of fear, places that are not assuring, conducive to contemplation, or nurturant. It is not surprising that despite the media attention devoted to deconstructivism, its actual impact on the landscape and the urban design profession is negligible. Rather, it seems more of a passing fancy of some designers dissatisfied with the bulk of what is being produced and seeking alternatives, commissions, and notoriety.

A final response to postmodern insecurity has been a spiritual one. With the faltering of faith in the modern project, there has been a (re)turn to spirituality and mysticism throughout the Western world. In the tradition of earlier

thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche, a number of recent observers of the human condition have called for a spiritual turn to mollify the harshness of the modern world. This tendency is found across the spectrum from writers as diverse as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Charles Jencks, David Griffin, and Charlene Spretnak. Spretnak suggests turning to wisdom traditions such as those of the Buddha, Native Americans, Goddess spirituality, and the Semitic traditions, which can

help us to nourish wonder and hence to appreciate difference, the unique subjectivity of every being and community, thereby subverting the flattening process of mass culture. Such awareness keeps hope alive. It protects consciousness from becoming so beaten down that it loses a grasp of what is worth fighting to defend.<sup>97</sup>

Griffin describes this spiritual turn as a move from disenchantment to "re-enchancement."

Champions of the potential for new communications technologies, although they apply hyperrational means, often sound much like those with explicit spiritual messages.<sup>98</sup> Self-described "technopagans" actually do see the computer as a tool for connecting with some larger entity, perhaps to God.<sup>99</sup> With the replacement of a communications zeitgeist for a labor zeitgeist, Jurgen Habermas has observed, the post-Enlightenment secular utopian impulse, so prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has virtually disappeared, appearing—when at all—in a religious guise.<sup>100</sup> Perhaps this return to a more mystical or religious utopian vision reflects a reconception of space whereby symbolic space or cyberspace is privileged over physical space, which has been largely neutralized.

#### Shelter or Storm?

Postmodern urban design trends have their counterparts in intellectual trends. Regionalist urban design recalls attempts to introduce multicultural themes into academic curricula. The nostalgia among urban designers bears interesting parallels to neoconservative crisis literature and the "cultural literacy" campaign, which bemoan the decline of order in contemporary society and invoke a return to an idealized past, morality, or canon. And the escapist and privatistic reflexes may be detected in poststructuralism's assertion that there is nothing but cultural construction in human experience (for example, Derrida's "there is nothing outside the text"), in its understanding of things we share like language and culture as "prison houses" from which we must escape, and its valorization of autonomy and control.

In contrast to these largely insular academic debates, however, the debate surrounding urban design affects the shape of our environment and is tested by

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those who live in it. Do these urban design efforts achieve their goals, particularly that of diminishing danger and providing a sense of security? Or does the concerted effort to plan for spontaneity, to invent traditions, and to design for diversion and escape subvert this intent? The answer is not clear-cut.

Certainly, the popularity of neotraditionalist and regionalist urban design and of "themed" environments bespeaks a certain satisfaction with them. But the concerted effort among urban designers to respect differences and to design with regard to historical and regional contexts can itself become a style. This defeats its very purposes of being anti-universalistic, preserving "distinction," and celebrating pluralism. And even when a certain past or place is effectively recreated, will the colonial North American past or the preindustrial European village provide inhabitants who have different cultural traditions with a sense of roots and security? In addition, the pretense of designing preindustrial spaces for a postindustrial society denies important changes that have taken place and does not always correspond to contemporary needs and tastes.

Strategies such as gating, policing and other surveillance systems, and defensive urbanism do provide certain people with a limited sense of security. But such settings do not, according to recent studies, always diminish actual danger. And they also contribute to accentuating a more general sense of fear by increasing paranoia and distrust.

The escapist nature of all these undertakings—behind gates, into the past, other places, or fantasy worlds—may emit signals that the present is too unsavory and must be actively suppressed. For urban designers, this escapism may also reveal a refusal to acknowledge their own changing role in society and their desire to return to a time when they were less in the thrall of the state and private developers. Ultimately, however, this attitude may render urban designers accomplices to the banes of capitalist urban development and contribute to exacerbate their own weakened position as well as the problems of the built environment that they are trying to remedy.

#### Reconstructive Approaches to Urban Design

Within this climate of fear and urban design that amplifies or succumbs to it, there are indicators of what a non-defensive—or offensive, living, proactive, or reconstructive—urbanism might be. This is reflected primarily in the growing attention towards protecting the environment, expressed in terms of "growth management" or "sustainable design." Such design intervenes so as not to deplete natural resources or impose hardship upon people, and so as to enhance both the physical and social landscapes. Urban designers sensitive to the fragmentation of the built environment increasingly have been attempting to "mend seams" among the various urban design professions and between these and their constituents. This has resulted in new forms of collaboration producing novel results, as in the efforts by Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Peter Calthorpe, and William Morrish and Catherine Brown to effect changes in policy as well as public opinion regarding the potential value of urban design.

Likewise, a number of urban design initiatives have been engaged in mending seams—or healing the scars—of modern interventions, such as railroads and highways built with little consideration for the surrounding communities and natural landscapes. This work involves reusing abandoned transit corridors, designing new ones, and redesigning existing urban and suburban fabrics, sometimes in collaboration with local communities. While these efforts share the neotraditionalist emphasis on enhancing the public realm, they are not necessarily intent upon emulating past townscapes, but consider instead contemporary lifestyles and aspire to retain the valuable elements of modern urbanism and architecture. Rather than direct their focus on the traditional center, they are more often concerned with the edges between the city, suburb, and countryside, between neighborhoods, between functional uses, and between the more metaphorical edges of disciplines, professions, and local communities.<sup>101</sup> In some instances, these initiatives aspire to eliminate the traditional center in an effort to do away with the social inequalities it supports.

#### Conclusion

Contemporary insecurity has elicited a reassertion of cultural diversity, a nostalgia for an idealized past, an infatuation with mass imagery, a flight into fantasy worlds, a marked privatism, and a spiritual turn. In urban design, these tendencies are primarily manifest as historicisms, regionalisms, and allusions to mass culture. With the exception perhaps of the spiritual turn, the seen-it-all done-it-all sophistication of these responses has engendered a blasé attitude and a studied ironic response. In its extreme, this attitude has led to a disengagement, a retreat

from asking questions and from acting. Although touted by some as the only responsible course given the circumstances of the contemporary world, this tendency also recalls the saying of the ancient Chinese philosopher Wang Yang-Ming, "To know and not to act is ultimately not to know."

Modern architecture and urban planning sought to assuage the fear generated by industrialization by rationally resolving current and future problems of "disorder" in the physical landscape. But instead of applying the industrial mode of production and machine imagery toward producing universal solutions for housing a more egalitarian society, the landscapes produced by modernism became, in the words of Liane Lefaivre, "synonymous with inhumanity, desolation, and devastation."<sup>102</sup> Modern architectural theory suffered from a confusion of terms that succeeded in preserving the architectural profession at the cost of exacerbating the crisis to which it was trying to respond. By deifying the machine while trying to transcend the fashion cycle and by paying lip service to a social and political agenda while insisting on the architect's role as an artist who acts independently, the modern movement succeeded only in offering a Band-Aid solution to the ills plaguing the modern city and the architectural profession rather than a cure. The profession of urban planning, meanwhile, diverged from its initial agenda to become primarily curative rather than preventive or formative. It was largely relegated to a rearguard position with a social agenda as only an impossible ideal or an "imperialistic" and undesirable end.

Consequently, those few who still carry the "modern" torch, who are forward looking and interested in designing for a "new" society, tend to be denigrated, especially in the United States. Proposals for buildings without ornament or for towers in a park rather than preindustrial-looking townscapes are often condemned as fascistic. And even where an idealistic desire to make a better world persists, the ability to do so is diminished because of the thoroughly transnational nature of power. Postmodern urbanism has sought to improve upon the shortcomings of modernism and to respond to the peculiar nature of fear that it attended and in part caused. But postmodernism has failed to retain the merits of modernism and has fallen into many of its same traps.

The misdirection of both modern and postmodern urban design can be traced to the early part of this century when architects contended with industrialization and when urban planning emerged as a profession. As the industrialization and bureaucratization of the building process threatened the architecture profession with extinction, it resorted to elitism. Rather than redefine its creative task to adapt to a changing political economy, it presumed environmental determinism in an effort to distinguish and thereby preserve itself. The lack of collab-

oration between architects, planners, and social scientists—as well as ineffectual efforts to collaborate—derives in large part from similar atavistic desires to maintain one's turf. The urban planning profession and the social sciences, both of which were sparked by the mounting problems engendered by industrial capitalism, diverged as planners focused on the modern city (the container) and social scientists focused on modern life (the contents). And the architectural profession largely divested itself of its traditional concerns with city building and with social concerns. The resultant division between thought about the container and thought about its contents facilitated the growth of the modern industrial city in a fashion that has suited the patrons of building more than the majority.

In the process, fear—along with the efforts to cope with it by referring to an idealized past, an exoticized other, a fantasy world, group cohesion, or oneself—has intensified. Amidst the less satisfactory urban design repercussions of this—especially the privatization and theme-park-ing of cities—some promising efforts have arisen to create living places as opposed to defensive generic spaces. If we are to effectively target the sources of dissatisfaction with the places in which we live, propose solutions, and implement them, we must learn from these efforts and initiate others that combine a respect for the past with a concern for the future and a reflexivity with a turning outward.

## Notes

NAN ELLIN  
SHELTER FROM THE STORM

1. As Alberto Moravia contends, "With the Revolution of '89, the bourgeois world, a materialistic world firmly bound to duration, that is, to the passage of time, superseded the feudal world, a world completely alienated from and immovably situated outside of time." Alberto Moravia, "The Terrorist Aesthetic," *Harper's Magazine* (June 1987): 37.
2. *Ibid.*, 37-38.
3. Jonas Frykman and Orvar Lofgren, *The Culture Builders*, trans. John Gills (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 142.
4. *Ibid.*, 270.
5. *Ibid.*, 29 (citing Michel Foucault).
6. *Ibid.*, 27.
7. *Ibid.*, 24.
8. *Ibid.*, 27.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 125.
11. *Ibid.*, 136.
12. *Ibid.*, 109.
13. *Ibid.*, 225.
14. *Ibid.*, 94.
15. *Ibid.*, 103.
16. *Ibid.*, 105.
17. *Ibid.*, 233.
18. *Ibid.*, 238.
19. *Ibid.*, 111.
20. Jeremy Bentham, cited in Anthony Vidler, "The Scenes of the Street," in *On Streets*, ed. Stanford Anderson, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 54.
21. Vidler, "Scenes of Street," 58.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See John Friedmann, *Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
24. *Ibid.*
25. Vidler, "Scenes of Street," 29.
26. Friedmann, *Planning in Public Domain*.
27. Baron Haussmann, cited in Robert Moses, "What Happened to Haussmann?" *Architectural Forum* (July 1942): 59.
28. Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts Into Air* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1982), 150.
29. Françoise Choay, *The Modern City: Planning in the 19th Century* (New York: George Braziller, 1969), 15.
30. Gary Wray McDonough, *Conflict in Catalonia* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1986), 35.
31. César Daly, *Architecture privée sous Napoleon III* (Paris: Ducher et Cie, 1877).
32. Frykman and Lofgren, *Culture Builders*, 126.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, 140.
35. E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-discipline, and Industrial Capitalism" *Past and Present* 38 (1967): 56-97.
36. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 11.
37. Charles Pierre Baudelaire, "The Painter of Modern Life" (1863), cited in *ibid.*, 10.
38. Berman, *All That is Solid*, 15.
39. Paul Rabinow, *French Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 77.
40. The roots of urban planning are sometimes located within Enlightenment thought or even earlier. I focus here, however, on its modern form as it crystallized around the last turn of the century along with—and in response to—the rise of the liberal state and industrial capitalism. Prior to this modern split between the container and its contents, nineteenth-century thinkers and designers (such as Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, Jean-Baptiste Godin, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, John Ruskin and William Morris, Baron Haussmann, Frederick Law Olmsted, and Ebenezer Howard) did not dissociate the physical landscape from the social one.
41. James Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 52.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Jean Guilleux, *European* (Paris: Plan Construction, 1989), 18. Translated from the French by Nan Ellin.
44. Tom Schumacher, "Contextualism: Urban Ideals and Deformations," *Casabella* (1971): 81. Modernism diverged from both the romantic and classic traditions in its attitude toward public space. As Peter Calthorpe explains, "The romantic and classic traditions may appear contrary, but they share one basic trait: the public space—either street, square, or plaza—is the dominant form. The buildings are subservient. Though less true of the romantic, both traditions use urban buildings as the 'walls' of great outdoor 'rooms,'"



with the facades ornamenting and unifying, and public art 'furnishing' these rooms. Garnier's plan expresses a totally new sense: the building becomes the object, not defining the public space, but situated in it. . . . The buildings become autonomous forms placed in a park-like setting."

(Peter Calthorpe, "A Short History of Twentieth Century New Towns," in *Sustainable Communities*, ed. Sim Van der Ryn and Peter Calthorpe [San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1986], 203–04.) The proposals of both Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright were thus modern in their conception of form because they conceived of "the building as an autonomous object maintaining responsibility only to internal functions, rather than the old urban tradition in which the building defined the public space that it fronted." (Ibid., 206.)

45. Bernard Huet, "L'Architecture contre la Ville," *AMC* 14 (December 1986): 12. Translated from the French by Nan Ellin.
46. Holston, *Modernist City*, 52.
47. Vincent Scully, *American Architecture and Urbanism* (1969; revised edition; New York: Henry Holt, 1988).
48. Anthony Vidler, "The Third Typology," *Rational Architecture*, ed. Robert Delevoy (Brussels: Archives d'Architecture Moderne, 1978), 30.
49. Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development* (1973; reprint, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976), 52.
50. Fredric Jameson, "Architecture and the Critique of Ideology," in *Architecture, Criticism, Ideology*, ed. Joan Ockman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985), 78.
51. Ibid., 80.
52. Gwendolyn Wright, "Inventions and Interventions: American Urban Design in the Twentieth Century," in *Urban Revisions: Current Projects for the Public Realm*, ed. Elizabeth A. T. Smith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 27–37.
53. Edward T. Relf, *The Modern Urban Landscape* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 211.
54. See Nan Ellin, *Postmodern Urbanism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), chapter 7, "Crisis in the Architectural Profession."
55. Ibid., chapter 4, "The Postmodern Reflex."
56. Prior to the nineteenth century, "one tended to find a more directly existential type of nostalgia, arising more 'naturally' from estrangement or alienation." By the latter part of that century, this combined with a more willful, synthetic, and politically driven nostalgia, which became "incorporated—for the most part capitalistically—into consumerist, image-conveyed nostalgia." This

late-twentieth-century nostalgia both universalizes particulars and particularizes universals; it is "both collective on a global scale and directed at globality itself." Roland Robertson, "After Nostalgia? Willful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization," in *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*, ed. Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 54–56.

57. Jameson writes, "The appetite for images of the past, in the form of what might be called simulacra, the increasing production of such images of all kinds, in particular in that peculiar postmodern genre, the nostalgic film, with its glossy evocation of the past as sheer consumable fashion and image—all this seems to me something of a return of the repressed, an unconscious sense of the loss of the past, which this appetite for images seeks desperately to overcome." Fredric Jameson, cited in *ibid.*, 54. See also Ellin, *Postmodern Urbanism*.
58. Advertisement for *Good Housekeeping*, *New York Times*, 9 October 1988.
59. Jon Pareles, "When Country Music Moves to the Suburbs," *New York Times*, 25 November 1990, sec. 2, page 1.
60. Suzanne Slesin, "Character Counts," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 April 1993.
61. Ibid.
62. Sharon Zukin, *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 68.
63. Benjamin Thompson, cited in Beverly Russell, *Architecture and Design 1970–1990: New Ideas in America* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1989), 115.
64. See Kevin Lynch, *Image of the City* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960).
65. In 1961, in one of the earliest articulations, Jane Jacobs called for a return to the street. She claimed, "It is futile to try to evade the issue of unsafe city streets by attempting to make some other features of a locality, say interior courtyards, or sheltered play spaces, safe instead." (Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities: The Failure of Town Planning* [New York: Vintage, 1961], 35.) Jacobs's concern with the declining quality and quantity of public space was echoed by others such as Lewis Mumford (*The City in History* [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1961]), who also championed preindustrial cityscapes; Jurgen Habermas, whose discussion on "the structural transformation of the public sphere" appeared in 1962 (*Habilitationsschrift, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* [Darmstadt: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962]; published in French as *L'Espace Public*, [Paris: Payot, 1978]; published in English as *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas

Burger [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989]; Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander (*Community and Privacy: Toward a New Architecture of Humanism* [New York: Doubleday, 1963]); and Richard Sennett (*The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life* [New York: Random House, 1970], *The Fall of Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism* [New York: Random House, 1974], and *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities* [New York: Knopf, 1990]), who suggested that we combat the decline of meaningful public space by juxtaposing socially diverse neighborhoods (*Conscience of Eye*) since plurality "is the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm" (*Uses of Disorder*, 11). A different perspective was offered by Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

66. See Nan Ellin, *In Search of a Usable Past: Urban Design in a French New Town* (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994) and Ellin, *Postmodern Urbanism*.
67. See Peter Calthorpe, "Introduction" and "Pedestrian Pockets: New Strategies for Suburban Growth," in *The Pedestrian Pocket Book: A New Suburban Design Strategy*, ed. Doug Kelbaugh (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1989), 3–20 and Peter Calthorpe, *The Next American Metropolis* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993).
68. This discussion of interior design draws in part from Paul Goldberger, "Four Walls and a Door," *New York Times* (14 October 1990): Home section, 40, 66–7.
69. "Hip Hotels Help Set Interior Design Trends," *Cincinnati Enquirer*, 22 June 1996.
70. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989) 3–18 and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
71. Martin Heidegger, cited in Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, 35.
72. Kathleen Stewart, "Nostalgia—A Polemic," in *Cultural Anthropology* vol. 3 no. 3 (1988): 227–41.
73. Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).
74. Sennett, *Fall of Public Man*, 5. More recent contributions to this discussion of the privatization of public space include Roslyn Deutsche, "Questioning the Public Space," *Public* 6 (1992): 49–64, Bruce Robbins, ed., *The Phantom Public Realm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), and Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public

Sphere," in Robbins, *Phantom Public Realm*.

75. Jérôme Bindé, "Le Pavillon des Aliénés ou le Fantôme du Privé," in *Paysage Pavillonnaire*, ed. IFA (Paris: Institut Français d'Architecture, 1982), 37. Translated from the French by Nan Ellin.
76. This political rationality was linked to the rise of the state, the expansion of capitalism, the primacy of scientific categories over juridical ones, and the increased interest in the individual as an object of political and scientific concern.
77. Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
78. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1980), 86. Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfuss elaborate, "In traditional forms of power, like that of the sovereign, power itself is made visible, brought out in the open, put constantly on display. The multitudes are kept in the shadows, appearing only at the edges of power's brilliant glow. Disciplinary power reverses these relations. Now, it is power itself which seeks invisibility and the objects of power—those on whom it operates—are made the most visible. It is this fact of surveillance, constant visibility, which is the key to disciplinary technology." (Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfuss, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 159). "Whereas in monarchical regimes it was the sovereign who had the greatest visibility, under the institutions of biopower it is those who are to be disciplined, observed, and understood who are made the most visible." (Ibid., 191.)
79. Moravia, "Terrorist Aesthetic."
80. See Mark Dery, *Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End of the Century* (New York: Grove Press, 1996).
81. This discussion of virtual reality, RL, and MUDs draws from Sherry Turkle, "Who Am We? Wired (January 1996): 149–51, 194–99.
82. Rachel Simon, community relations coordinator for Barnes & Noble, Princeton, New Jersey.
83. Ralph Rugoff, "L.A.'s New Car-tography," *L.A. Weekly* (6 October 1995): 35.
84. I am indebted to Ralph Rugoff for the discussion apropos clothes and cars and to Mark Dery apropos body modification and its relation to cyberculture.
85. See Charles Jencks's essay in this volume.
86. Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefavre, "The Narcissistic Phase in Architecture," *Harvard Architectural Review* 1 (Spring 1980): 24.
87. Ibid., 23.
88. Ada Louise Huxtable, "Is Modern Architecture Dead?" *Architectural Record* 169 (October 1981): 104. According to Huxtable, "Style, as it is being written about and embraced today, is no longer style as we have previously defined and under-

NAN ELLIN  
SHELTER FROM THE STORM (contd.)

- stood it—as an attempt to give appropriate expression to a kind of life, or society, or collective need, or moment in cultural time.” Instead, “Like so much else today, the emphasis is on self and the senses, with ‘design’ an increasingly hermetic and narcissistic process, serving as often to short circuit purpose and accessibility as to expand the horizons of constructive vision. Style is being dangerously confused with art.” Huxtable believes that “This pursuit of style for its own sake is a logical consequence of the death of the twentieth-century belief in salvation through design and the architect’s rejection of any social contract. If there is to be no brave new world, if scientific and technological progress are not to be the bearers of its art and joy, then modernism, with its very specific message of the perfectibility of the human condition through the quality of the built environment, can no longer be considered the only appropriate vehicle of expression for the conditions and spirit of this century.” She maintains that “These factors, above all, have changed the rules, and the approach, to the practice of architecture today. There is no Zeitgeist demanding recognition and fealty, no unifying force or sentiment, no greater public good, no banner around which architects can rally. They can go in any direction and follow any muse. This is surely one of the most open, challenging, promising, and dangerous moments in the history of the building art.”
89. Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication” in *The Anti-Aesthetic*, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1983), 2.
90. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 119.
91. *Ibid.*
92. Umberto Eco, *Travels in Hyperreality* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 7, 8, 30.
93. Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, 300.
94. Daniel Solomon, “Fixing Suburbia” in *The Pedestrian Pocket Book: A New Suburban Design Strategy*, ed. Doug Kelbaugh (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1989), 96.
95. As Christine Boyer suggests, urban design that freely quotes from the past and mass imagery can engender a “blasé attitude,” for it implies that the city is “after all just entertainment; we are only there to look and to buy. The city has become a place of escape, a wonderland that evades reality, for there is nothing more to think about in pure entertainment.” With consumption replacing production as the primary economic role of our central cities, Boyer explains,

- they become places of “pure play.” M. Christine Boyer, “The Return of Aesthetics to City Planning,” *Philosophical Streets*, ed. Dennis Crow (Washington D.C.: Maison Neuve, 1990), 97–98.
96. Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, 97.
97. Charlene Spretnak, *States of Grace: The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 223.
98. See Margaret Wertheim’s essay in this volume.
99. Dery, *Escape Velocity*.
100. As Habermas explains, the post-1968 period has been witnessing an “exhaustion of utopian energies” (Jurgen Habermas, “The New Obscurity,” trans. Phillip Jacobs, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* vol. 2 no. 2 [1986]: 3). As a communications zeitgeist replaces a labor zeitgeist (which prevailed from the French Revolution to 1968), he says, the specific utopian idea based on social labor is over. That idea arose out of a new perception of time such that hopes for paradise shifted to this world. With the advent of the communications zeitgeist two centuries later, Habermas observes, utopian expectations seem to be taking on a religious form once again.
101. This attention to the edge has nothing to do with the building of “edge cities” that create new barriers rather than breaking down old ones, and that are market-driven rather than the product of considered thought and action.
102. Liane Lefavre, “Dirty Realism in European Architecture Today: Making the Stone Story,” *Design Book Review* 17 (Winter 1989): 17.

STEVEN FLUSTY  
BUILDING PARANOIA

1. Herbert I. Schiller, *Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Promotional brochure for Metropolitan Structures West’s California Plaza.
3. Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Construction of Communities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

RICHARD SENNETT  
THE SEARCH FOR A PLACE IN THE WORLD

1. Michael Hammer and James Champy, *Reengineering the Corporation* (New York: Harper Business, 1993).
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Gateway Editions, 1957).
3. Hammer and Champy, *Reengineering the Corporation*.

RICHARD SENNETT  
THE SEARCH FOR A PLACE IN THE WORLD  
(contd.)

4. Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, trans. Paul J. W. Miller (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

JANE HARRISON  
MULTIPLICATION + SUBDIVISION

I am grateful to Jonathan Wetherill and Craig Kim for their invaluable assistance.

EDWARD J. BLAKELY AND MARY GAIL SNYDER  
DIVIDED WE FALL

1. Based on estimates of the total number of community associations, sample surveys of associations size, and our survey results that nineteen percent of all community associations are gated.
2. We conducted a survey of nearly 2000 community association boards throughout the United States through the auspices of the Community Association Institute in 1994, adding a separate set of questions for gated communities.
3. Peter Marcuse, this volume, 104. See also Peter Marcuse, “Of Walls and Immigrant Enclaves,” in *Immigrant Absorption*, ed. Naomi Carmen (New York: Macmillan, 1996).
4. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1961).
5. Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

PETER MARCUSE  
WALLS OF FEAR AND WALLS OF SUPPORT

1. I have referred to the metaphorical understanding of walls in an earlier version of this paper, “Walls as Metaphor and Reality,” in *Managing Divided Cities*, ed. Seamus Dunn (Staffordshire, England: Ryburn Publishing, 1994), 41–52.
2. W. H. Bau, “Fortifications,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 9 (Chicago: William Benton, 1959), 538.
3. The Great Wall may also have been part of that history that led to the prominence of walls in Chinese city development. “Walls, walls, and yet again walls form the framework of every Chinese city. They surround it, they divide it into lots and compounds, they mark more than any other structures the basic features of the Chinese communities. There is no real city in China without a surrounding wall, a condition which indeed is

expressed by the fact that the Chinese used the same word “ch’eng” for a city and a city wall.” (*Ibid.*, 557.) I am not well enough informed on Chinese history to know if the linkage I am suggesting has substance.

4. There have in fact been military sieges of cities in very recent times: one thinks of Leningrad, Srebrenica, and the ghetto of Warsaw. But the defenses here were walls not ever calculated to hold back an attacking army, but whatever buildings, structures, and weapons were at hand. Stronger walls would not have helped. The most recent attempt to place confidence in physical walls as defense was probably the ill-fated underground bunkers built by Saddam Hussein against the invading forces of the United States and its allies in the Gulf War.
5. While the examples given here are confined to the United States, there is an international trend towards the creation of new and quite separate, bounded business districts, of which La Defense in Paris and Docklands in London are only the best-known examples. Such examples can be found in cities as different as Sao Paolo, Calcutta, and Johannesburg.
6. Nathan Glazer, “Divided Cities, Dual Cities: The Case of New York” in Dunn, *Managing Divided Cities*, 176–190. Glazer analogizes that distinction to one between the concept of “dual cities” and that of “divided cities,” perhaps an analytically useful distinction but one too far removed from common use, it seems to me, to be viable. While I have expressed skepticism similar to Glazer’s about the “dual cities” formulation (see Peter Marcuse, “Dual City: A Muddy Metaphor for a Quartered City,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* vol. 13, no. 4 [December 1989]: 697–708), I consider it useful, as he may not, to attempt to specify more carefully what the multiple divisions are and how they line up against each other.
7. I have discussed the concept of the “quartered city” in several other pieces. (See Marcuse, “Dual City,” and Marcuse, “Housing Markets and Labour Markets in the Quartered City,” in *Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections*, ed. John Allen and Chris Hammett, [London: Unwin Hyman, 1991], 118–35.) “Quartered” is used both in the sense of “drawn and quartered” and of residential “quarters”; there are essentially four such quarters, the very wealthy not being bound by any specific spatial configuration as to where they live. See also John H. Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells, eds., *Dual City: Restructuring New York* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991), especially the introduction and conclusion, and Leonard Wallock, “Tales of Two Cities: Gentrification and Displacement in Contemporary New